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ritics of corporate stock buybacks have described 
them as a form of financial engineering whose 
primary aim aim is to boost reported earnings 
per share. If such payouts of corporate cash have 
any “real” effects on long-run operating efficiency and value, 
according to such critics, it is the negative effect of reducing 
the amount of funds available for promising investments.
Defenders of stock repurchases respond to this claim by 
arguing that buybacks give companies a tax-efficient way of 
paying out capital that cannot be profitably reinvested inside 
the firm. What’s more, by paying out such capital, companies 
are likely to be increasing the value of their shares just by 
preventing management from taking on low-return projects, 
such as diversifying acquisitions, which are likely to reduce 
corporate returns on capital and destroy value.
Besides paying out excess capital and possibly exerting 
pressure on management to make more efficient use of it,1 
share repurchases are also said to provide corporate manag-
ers with an opportunity to create value for their shareholders 
by buying back undervalued shares—that is, shares whose 
current price does not reflect the value of the firm as perceived 
by management (and perhaps the company’s most sophisti-
cated or far-sighted investors). To the extent managers are able 
to identify such opportunities, they are effectively transferring 
wealth from the shareholders who sell to those who choose 
to stay.
Moreover, many corporate managers, when considering 
the possibility of stock buybacks, evaluate them as a kind of 
alternative “investment” with a projected return on capital 
that can be different from the market’s current expected rate 
of return. (If the company’s stock is “fully” or correctly valued 
at the time of the repurchase, then the projected return should 
be identical to the firm’s cost of capital—in which case, there 
would be no transfer of value between selling and remaining 
shareholders.) And according to a survey conducted by John 
Graham and colleagues at Duke’s Fuqua School in 2005,2 
over 86% of the 400 corporate CFOs who responded to the 
survey said that they “agree” or “strongly agree” with the 
statement that “companies repurchase when their stock is a 
good value relative to its true value.” Moreover, about half of 
the CEOs who participated in follow-up interviews said that 
their companies keep track of their repurchase timing and 
have been able to beat the market consistently, with some 
CFOs claiming success in outperforming the market by $1 
or $2 a share during the course of a year.
In a study published recently in the Journal of Financial 
Economics, we attempted to determine whether companies 
that buy back their own stock earn more (or less, as many 
critics have charged) than a market return on such “invest-
ments.” Since 2004, the SEC has required U.S. publicly traded 
companies to disclose the number of shares repurchased each 
month, the average price paid for repurchases over the month, 
and whether the shares were repurchased as part of a public 
plan. We used this disclosed data to evaluate both the ability 
of companies in general to time the market and to detect any 
“cross-sectional” patterns that would help us identify the kinds 
of companies—and the circumstances or ways in which such 
companies operate—that have consistently succeeded (or 
failed) to repurchase their stock at what prove to be bargain 
prices for their shareholders who choose not to sell. 
The Sample
Our sample consisted of all 2,237 publicly traded U.S. 
companies that repurchased their own stock as part of open 
market stock repurchase programs between 2004 and 2011. 
For each company repurchasing stock during this eight-year 
period, we collected the average prices at which the shares 
are repurchased as well as the number of shares repurchased 
each month, as reported in the companies’ 10-K and 10-Q 
filings with the SEC. Moreover, we were the first research-
ers to examine the average price paid and number of shares 
that were actually repurchased on a monthly basis for a full 
sample of repurchasing companies.
Repurchase Activity
Figure 1 shows the number of repurchasing companies for 
each year in our sample from 2004 through 2011. As shown 
in the figure, the frequency and volume of repurchase activ-
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than companies that repurchase more frequently. We identi-
fied “frequent repurchasers” as those that repurchased at least 
nine times in a year, “moderate repurchasers” as those that 
repurchased between five and eight times a year, and “infre-
ity has varied considerably over time. The largest number of 
companies repurchasing was in 2008 (with 1,216 companies), 
with the smallest number repurchased (675 companies) in 
the following year. 
As shown in Figure 2, we classified repurchasing compa-
nies into groups based upon their repurchasing frequency in a 
given year. Companies that repurchase only a few times a year 
are likely to have more flexibility in timing their buybacks 
The question of whether managers can time the market by buying back undervalued shares has spurred many 
academic studies, yet despite numerous investigations the 
answer remains unclear. Several papers have presented 
evidence in support of marketing timing, but others dispute 
the interpretation of the evidence.3 Therefore, whether 
companies repurchasing their stock have succeeded in iden-
tifying when it is undervalued—or when the general market 
is undervalued generally—has remained an open question. 
One strand of this literature examines long-run returns after 
the repurchase announcement,4 but this evidence is particu-
larly difficult to link to such “market timing” because many 
companies announce repurchase programs but never actu-
ally repurchase their stock.5 Another difficulty for researchers 
has been that, until recently, companies were not required 
to disclose actual repurchases, which meant that research-
ers could only infer repurchase amounts on a quarterly basis 
(without any way of determining the exact prices at which 
the buybacks were carried out). 
In 2003, the SEC amended Exchange Act Rule 10b-18, 
requiring companies to disclose all repurchases in their 
annual and quarterly reports, starting in March 15, 2004. 
As a result, at the end of each fiscal quarter, companies are 
now required to disclose the number of shares repurchased 
each month, the average price paid for repurchases over the 
month, and whether the shares were repurchased as part of a 
public plan. Our study used these data to evaluate both the 
ability of companies to time the market and the kinds (or 
practices) of companies that have demonstrated an ability to 
repurchase at low and possibly undervalued prices. 
The Findings of Previous Studies
Figure 1  Number of Repurchases Per Year 
Figure 1 depicts annual number of share repurchases done by 
public firms between 2004-2012.
Figure 2   Number of Repurchases Per Year, by  
Repurchase Frequency 
Figure 2 depicts percentage of total annual number of share 
repurchases done by public firms between 2004-2012, cat-
egorized by repurchasing frequency (infrequent repurchasers 
repurchase between 1-4 times per year, moderate repurchases 
repurchase between 5-8 times per year, while frequent repur-
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6. We designate the repurchase as taking place in month 0. We calculate the Relative 
Repurchase Price (RRP) as the average price paid by the firm in the repurchase month 
(month 0), REP0, divided by the average daily market price of the firm’s stock in the re-
purchasing month through “t” months later, AP+t, and we subtract one to get a percent-




– 1  
For example, RRP+6 measures the percentage difference between the price paid by 
firm during the repurchase month and the average daily market price of the stock from 
the repurchase month through six months after the repurchase.
our sample differed significantly from infrequent repurchasers 
on many dimensions. Frequent repurchasers were significantly 
larger and more profitable, and had higher market-to-book 
and dividend payout ratios than infrequent repurchasers. 
Frequent repurchasers also had a smaller bid-ask spread and 
lower stock return volatility. As summarized graphically in 
Figures 2 and 3, the findings reported in Table 1 confirm 
that, although frequent repurchasers bought back less on a 
monthly basis than infrequent repurchasers, they tended to 
repurchase more over the entire year (though the difference 
is statistically significant only for the medians). Although the 
median frequent repurchaser’s monthly repurchase was 0.32% 
of market value (as compared to 0.44% for infrequent repur-
chasers), the median frequent repurchaser bought back 4.6% 
of the company’s market value on an annual basis (as compared 
to 1.2% for infrequent repurchasers). These differences suggest 
that the motives for repurchasing, and the potential role of 
market timing, is likely to be quite different for frequent and 
infrequent repurchasers—a subject we come back to later.
Measuring Undervaluation
To measure market timing, we compared the average price 
paid for repurchases during the month to the average price at 
which the firm’s shares traded during the repurchase month 
as well as various time periods, including the months after the 
repurchase. We refer to this variable as the “Relative Repur-
chase Price” (RRP), and it can be thought of as the percentage 
difference between the average price paid by the firm during 
the repurchase month (REP) and the average daily market 
price of the firm’s stock (AP) over various timeframes. We 
estimated the RRP by comparing the average repurchase 
price paid by the firm during the repurchase month with the 
average daily stock market price from the repurchase month 
through one-, three- and six-month windows after the repur-
chase month.6 To the extent that corporate managers are able 
to determine when their company’s stock is undervalued, we 
expected them to buy at prices that would turn out to be 
lower than future prices. 
By contrast, most of the studies of the long-run “perfor-
mance” of stock buybacks track price changes from the time 
of the announcement of the repurchase. And because such 
announcements tend to take place months or even years 
before the actual repurchases, our study provides a more precise 
measure of managerial timing with repurchases. To the extent 
that managers were able to recognize when their stock is under-
valued, we expected their RRP to be significantly negative. 
In Figure 4, we provide a number of examples taken 
from our sample of companies that show how the RRP was 
quent repurchasers” as those that repurchased one to four 
times during the year. As shown in Figure 2, about half of 
all the companies in our sample repurchased infrequently, 
four or fewer times during the year. Perhaps more surpris-
ingly, almost 20% of repurchasing companies repurchased 
frequently, at least nine times a year. 
Although infrequent repurchasers conducted about 50% 
of all repurchases in any given year, Figure 3 shows that they 
accounted for only about 10% of the total market value of 
repurchases in any given year (where total market value is the 
number of shares repurchased times the average price at which 
they were repurchased in any given month). By contrast, 
frequent repurchasers accounted for about 60-70% of the 
total market value of all repurchases in any given year. Thus, 
although many more companies repurchased infrequently, 
fewer than four times a year, frequent repurchasers—again, 
those repurchasing at least nine times a year—bought back 
the largest dollar volume of shares.
Characteristics of Repurchasing Companies
Table 1 presents the means (medians) of a number of relevant 
company characteristics for the full sample and for subsamples 
based on repurchase frequency. The frequent repurchasers in 
Figure 3   Total Market Value of Repurchases Per Year,  
by Repurchasing Frequency 
Figure 3 depicts percentage of total market value of 
repurchases done by public firms between 2004 and 2012, 
categorized by repurchasing frequency (infrequent repurchasers 
repurchase between 1-4 times per year, moderate repurchases 
repurchase between 5-8 times per year, while frequent 
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shares at significant discounts (of 9% and 12%, respectively) 
from the average share price between the repurchase month 
and three months later.
In Panel B of Figure 4 we demonstrate similar calcu-
lations for two other firms, examining a window from the 
purchase month through six months later. Firm 3 repur-
chased shares in May of 2004 at an average price of $5.07. 
The average stock price from the repurchase month through 
six months later was $6.70. Thus, Firm 3 repurchased its 
shares at a 24% discount from its average share price during 
the next six months (RRP+6 = $5.07/$6.70 – 1 = –24%). 
Finally, in the far right figure in Panel A, we can see 
that Firm 4 repurchased shares in August of 2007 at a 35% 
discount from its average share price during the next six 
months. Specifically, Firm 4 repurchased at an average price 
of $19.01, while the average share price from the repurchase 
month through six months later was $29.25, giving us an 
RRP+6 of −35% ($19.01/$29.25 – 1).
calculated. Panel A demonstrates how we calculate the RRP 
looking forward three months after the repurchase (RRP+3), 
while Panel B demonstrates the calculation for the RRP 
looking forward six months after the repurchase (RRP+6). 
As shown in Panel A of Figure 4, Firm 1 repurchased 
shares during December 2011 at an average price of $7.82. 
As shown in the figure, between the repurchase month and 
three months after the repurchase, Firm 1’s shares sold for 
an average of $8.62. Thus, we calculated the RRP+3 for Firm 
1 as the repurchase price paid divided by the average price 
from the repurchase month through three months later and 
subtract one: RPP+3 = $7.82/$8.62 – 1 = –9%. 
As also reported in Panel A, Firm 2 repurchased shares in 
July 2010 at an average price of $14.68. Between the repur-
chase month and three months after the repurchase, Firm 
2’s shares sold for an average of $16.61. Thus, we calculated 
RRP+3 for Firm 2 as $14.68/$16.61 – 1, which equals –12%. 
In sum, both Firm 1 and Firm 2 ended up repurchasing their 
Firm characteristic Full sample
Repurchase frequency
Difference: Frequent – InfrequentInfrequent Moderate Frequent






































































































Number of observations 7,496 3,765 2,250 1,481
Table 1  Summary Statistics of Repurchasing Firms 
   The table below provides summary statistics on various firm and stock characteristics for the full sample and by 
repurchasing frequency. The far-right column presents differences between means (medians) for frequent and infrequent 
repurchasers. ***, **, and * indicate significant differences between the groups presented at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively, using T-tests for means (Wilcoxon non-parametric test for medians).
77Journal of Applied Corporate Finance • Volume 28 Number 4  Fall 2016
year. What this tells us is that more than half of all compa-
nies repurchased their shares at small discounts relative to 
their average stock price in the repurchase month. For the 
entire sample, companies repurchased their shares at a median 
0.88% discount to the average share price for the repurchase 
month. 
When measuring the RRP using longer post-repurchase 
windows, we found that the median RRP was negative 
for most repurchase years, but not for 2007 and 2008. In 
fact, the median company that repurchased shares in 2008 
ended up paying an 8.4% premium for those shares, when 
measured from the repurchase month through six months 
later. By contrast, companies that repurchased shares in 
2009 and 2010 repurchased them at the largest discounts, 
with median discounts of 9.5% for 2009 and 6.6% for 
As these examples are meant to suggest, some companies 
have succeeded in repurchasing undervalued shares. In the 
next section, we investigate the extent to which companies 
in general have been able to repurchase shares at a discount 
relative to the future stock price.
Evidence on Whether Companies Are Able to 
Recognize When Their Stock Is Undervalued
Figure 5 shows the median RRPs for all repurchasers in our 
sample on an annual basis from 2004-2011. For example, 
RRPs are presented for the repurchase month, for the repur-
chase month through one month later, three months later, 
and six months later. 
As shown by the black bars in the figure, the median 
RRP for the repurchase month was negative in every single 
Figure 4  Examples of Relative Repurchase Prices (RRPs) for Selective Companies in Sample 
  Figure 4 depicts the calculation of Relative Repurchase Prices for four repurchasing firms in our sample. 
  Panel A provides the RRP from the repurchase month through three months later for two repurchasers, while 
  Panel B provides the RRP from the repurchase month through six months later for two other repurchasers.
Panel A: Calculating the Relative Repurchase Price for (0,+3) months: RRP+3
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Figure 5  Median Relative Repurchase Prices (RRPs) for Full Sample at Various Windows 
   Figure 5 depicts median RRPs for our full sample of 38,900 monthly repurchases conducted by 2,237 firms from 
2004 to 2011. The figure presents a measure of the percentage difference between the median repurchase price paid 
by a firm during the repurchase month (as reported in the 10-K) and the average closing stock prices (as reported 
by the Center for Research in Security Prices, CRSP) during the repurchase month and from the repurchase month 
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Figure 6  RRPs by Repurchasing Frequency 
   Figure 6 depicts median RRPs for our full sample of 38,900 monthly repurchases conducted by 2,237 firms from 
2004 to 2011 by repurchasing frequency. The figure presents a measure of the percentage difference between the 
median repurchase price paid by a firm during the repurchase month (as reported in the 10-K) and the average closing 
stock prices (as reported by the Center for Research in Security Prices, CRSP) during the repurchase month and from 
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and are able to repurchase shares at a discount relative to the 
future stock price. A natural question is whether companies 
try to signal their perceived undervaluation through their 
repurchase announcement, since one motive commonly 
stated in companies’ repurchase announcements is to correct 
what they perceive as undervaluation of their own stock. 
To examine whether companies’ stated motivation to 
repurchase was related to the Relative Repurchase Price, 
we divided our sample based on motives stated in the 
announcements of corporate repurchase programs. (Note that 
announcements of repurchasing programs are made before 
firms actually start repurchasing.) After finding a total of 
2,921 repurchase announcements, we grouped together all 
companies whose stated motivation for the repurchase cited 
undervaluation. All other repurchase announcements, includ-
ing those in which no motive was provided, were assigned to 
a second group. 
When we then we examined the market’s response to the 
announcements of buyback programs by these two groups 
of companies, we found, as reported in Table 2, that compa-
nies making announcements of repurchase programs that 
included some mention of stock undervaluation had signifi-
cantly positive announcement returns of 2.1%, on average, 
for the three days surrounding the announcement. Moreover, 
the median announcement return was significantly higher for 
companies mentioning undervaluation in the announcement 
than for those that did not (there was no significant difference 
in mean returns). 
Next, we examined Relative Repurchase Prices based 
upon the motives stated by management in the repurchase 
program announcement. And as summarized in Figure 7, our 
findings showed little difference in the RRP measure for the 
two different groups of companies—those that mentioned 
undervaluation and those that did not.
2010. Over the entire sample period, and for all windows we 
examined, the median company in our sample repurchased its 
stock at a statistically significant discount—which, again, 
means that more than half of repurchasing companies bought 
back their shares at what turned out to be discounts to their 
future values. 
Repurchase Frequency and Success in  
Buying Back Undervalued Stock
As suggested earlier, the frequency with which a company 
buys back its own stock is likely to be negatively correlated 
with a manager’s ability to time the market and buy back 
undervalued shares. For example, companies that repur-
chase shares only once a year have more flexibility in terms 
of timing than firms that repurchase monthly.
When we examined how the frequency of repurchases 
relates to the Relative Repurchase Price, we found that the 
Relative Repurchase Price, as shown in Figure 6, decreased in 
a roughly linear way with the frequency of repurchase, regard-
less of comparison window. And in fact, the difference in the 
Relative Repurchase Prices among infrequent versus moderate 
or frequent repurchasers was strikingly large—and, indeed, 
perhaps the most important finding of our study. Using the 
window from the repurchase month through six months later, 
we found that companies that repurchased just once during 
the year had a median Relative Repurchase Price of −5.9%, as 
compared to only −1.5% for monthly repurchasers. And when 
we compared infrequent repurchasers (those that repurchase 
four or fewer times a year) with frequent repurchasers (those 
repurchasing at least nine times a year), we found a significant 
median difference of −2.4%. 
Companies’ Stated Motivation for Repurchasing 
The evidence presented thus far shows that some companies 
seem able to recognize when their shares are undervalued 
Table 2  Announcement Returns for Repurchase Announcements 
   The table examines the stated motivation for repurchases for 2,921 repurchase program announcements made from 
1999 to 2011 (announcing subsequent repurchases in our sample, which covers the period 2004 to 2011). Repur-
chase announcements are categorized into several categories of motivation for the share repurchase, and we select 
firms that mention “undervaluation” and “best use of money” as those with a stated motivation of mispricing. We pres-
ent the mean (median) three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for these repurchase program announcements, 
categorized by whether the firm made a repurchase announcement that suggests the stock could be mispriced.
Stated repurchase motivation Mean (Median) CAR Number of announcements
Stated motivation of mispricing 2.09%***
(1.65%)***
1,397
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7. See Seyhun (1986).
ing not mentioned); net insider buying (which measures the 
difference between insider purchases and sales during the 
repurchase month); and the firm characteristics shown in 
Table 1 (including year and firm fixed effects). The depen-
dent variable was the Relative Repurchase Price, measured 
over three comparison periods: through one-, three-, and 
six-months after the repurchase. We included two variables 
to capture repurchase frequency: Infrequent Repurchaser is 
an indicator variable equal to one for firms that repurchase 
one to four times a year, and Frequent Repurchaser is an 
indicator variable equal to one for firms that repurchase 
at least nine times a year (the excluded group is moderate 
repurchasers, which is captured in the intercept). To deter-
mine the impact of aggregate market timing, we included 
the overall market return for the period six months prior 
through the repurchase month (we used the pre-repurchase 
period for the aggregate market return because we assume 
managers could time the aggregate market by repurchasing 
following a decline, but are less able to predict future market 
movements). 
Controlling for all these characteristics, we found 
that, regardless of the event window we employed, infre-
quent repurchasers obtained a significantly lower Relative 
Differences among Kinds of Companies in the 
Relative Repurchase Prices 
As we noted earlier in Figure 6, frequent repurchasers paid 
significantly higher prices relative to their future stock price 
than did infrequent repurchasers. However, as shown in 
Table 1, we found significant differences in company char-
acteristics between frequent and infrequent repurchasers. 
For example, infrequent repurchasers tended to be smaller, 
with lower market-to-book and dividend payout ratios, and 
higher cash-to-asset ratios. Their shares also had higher bid-
ask spreads and stock return volatility.
In addition to these differences, we had to control for 
other factors that may affect the Relative Repurchase Price. 
For example, studies have shown that managers are able to 
time the market with their personal trades.7 To control for all 
these factors that could affect the Relative Repurchase Price, 
we used regression analysis of the Relative Repurchase Price 
in a multivariate setting.
In Table 3, we summarize the findings of our regressions 
of the Relative Repurchase Price on the following variables: 
repurchase frequency; an indicator variable equal to one 
for whether the firm announced the motivation for the 
repurchase program as mispricing (equals zero if mispric-
Figure 7  RRPs by Stated Repurchase Motivation 
   Figure 7 depicts median RRPs for our full sample of 38,900 monthly repurchases conducted by 2,237 firms from 
2004 to 2011 by the stated motivation given by the firm for the repurchase program. The figure presents a measure 
of the percentage difference between the median repurchase price paid by a firm during the repurchase month (as 
reported in the 10-K) and the average closing stock prices (as reported by the Center for Research in Security Prices, 
CRSP) during the repurchase month and from the repurchase month through one, three or six months later. This 
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Although we found no relation between the stated 
motive for the repurchase program and the RRP, we did 
find that companies paid a lower repurchase price when 
there was more insider buying (significant only for the six 
month after comparison window). Focusing on company 
characteristics, we found that smaller companies, compa-
Repurchase Price than moderate repurchasers (the excluded 
group), which is consistent with the “univariate” results 
we reported earlier (and were presented in Figure 6). For 
example, our findings can be interpreted as saying that the 
Relative Repurchase Price was 2.3% lower for infrequent 
repurchasers when using the six-month comparison window.
Table 3  Regressions of Relative Repurchase Price (RRP)
   The table reports regressions of the Relative Repurchase Price on firm and repurchasing characteristics. Relative 
Repurchase Price is measured as the percentage difference between the average repurchase price paid by the firm 
during a repurchase month (as reported in the 10-K) and the average closing stock prices as reported on CRSP, during 
various windows: repurchase month plus one, three, and six months. Accounting variables are summarized at the 
firm-year, measured at the fiscal year-end before the repurchase month. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
The regressions include year- and firm-fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the firm level. P-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Adjusted R2 0.154 0.224 0.342
Number of observations 15,206 15,206 15,206
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because their own company or the general market is under-
valued—while more frequent repurchasers appear to have 
other motives to repurchase than correcting—or profit-
ing from—undervaluation of the company’s stock. Like 
dividends, stock repurchases provide companies with a 
means of returning excess capital, which can in turn improve 
corporate operating efficiency and returns on capital. But 
since infrequent repurchasers tend to be smaller and have 
more volatile stock, as well as higher cash holdings—which 
are also confirmed in Table 3—such companies are likely 
to be much less troubled by the concern about having too 
much capital that, by contrast, is likely to be an impor-
tant consideration for companies that repurchase stock on 
a regular basis, with apparently much less attention to the 
prices paid.
nies with lower market-to-book ratios, and companies with 
more volatile stock returns obtained higher RRPs, which 
suggests that these kinds of companies were more likely to 
be seeking (and finding) opportunities to buy back under-
valued stock. We also found that the coefficient on the 
six-month prior market return was negative and significant, 
suggesting that companies pay lower Relative Repurchase 
Prices following market declines. This evidence suggests 
that corporate managers, besides recognizing when their 
own stock is undervalued, have also been able to time the 
aggregate market, repurchasing at lower prices when prior 
aggregate market returns have been lower.
Overall, the results summarized in Table 3 suggest 
that infrequent repurchasers have been able to buy back 
their stock at what turn out to be bargain prices—whether 
Intercept RMRF SMB HML Adj R2
Three-month returns
Infrequent 1–4 times/year 0.008*** 1.099*** 0.706*** −0.058 0.92
Frequent ≥9 times/year 0.002*** 0.917*** 0.355*** −0.015 0.97
Frequent − Infrequent 0.006*** 0.182*** 0.350*** −0.043 0.40
Six-month returns
Infrequent 1–4 times/year 0.007*** 1.093*** 0.664*** −0.026 0.93
Frequent ≥9 times/year 0.002** 0.923*** 0.373*** −0.000 0.96
Frequent − Infrequent 0.005*** 0.169*** 0.291*** −0.026 0.42
One-Year Returns 
Infrequent 1–4 times/year 0.006*** 1.068*** 0.711*** 0.046 0.94
Frequent ≥9 times/year 0.002* 0.934*** 0.382*** 0.028 0.96
Infrequent − Frequent 0.005*** 0.134*** 0.329*** 0.018 0.49
Two-Year Returns
Infrequent 1–4 times/year 0.005*** 1.077*** 0.717*** 0.099 0.94
Frequent ≥9 times/year 0.002** 0.944*** 0.393*** 0.060 0.96
Infrequent − Frequent 0.003*** 0.133*** 0.324*** 0.040 0.49
Three-Year Returns 
Infrequent = 1–4 times/year 0.005*** -1.078*** -0.719*** -0.111* 0.94
Frequent ≥9 times/year 0.002** -0.958*** -0.411*** -0.083** 0.96
Infrequent − Frequent 0.003*** 0.120*** 0.308*** 0.028 0.46
Table 4  Fama-French Regressions by Repurchasing Frequency 
   The table presents Fama and French regressions of market returns for various return windows following 38,900 
repurchase months from 2004 to 2011. For each calendar month of the sample period, we construct a portfolio 
consisting of all firms making a repurchase within the three, six, 12, 24, or 36 months. To do this, we add firms to 
the portfolio in the month that they repurchase stock and the stock is retained in the portfolio for three, six, 12, 24, 
or 36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month and an equal-weighted portfolio excess return is calculated. The 
resulting time series of monthly excess returns is regressed on the three Fama and French (1993) factors: the market 
return minus the risk-free rate (RMRF), returns on a portfolio of small firms minus returns on a portfolio of big firms 
(SMB), and returns on a high book-to-market portfolio minus returns on a low book-to-market portfolio (HML). The 
estimated intercept from the regression of portfolio returns is used as a measure of abnormal performance. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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8. These risk-adjusted returns are captured by the intercept (or “alpha”) utilizing 
Fama and French (1993) regressions. The regressions control for the three Fama and 
French factors: the market return minus the risk-free rate (RMRF), returns on a portfolio 
of small firms minus returns on a portfolio of big firms (SMB), and returns on a high 
book-to-market portfolio minus returns on a low book-to-market portfolio (HML).
9. For the month of the repurchase, we estimate the return by comparing the repur-
chase price with the month-end closing price to capture the return relative to the repur-
chase price. All other monthly returns are calculated using monthly returns from CRSP. 
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly, calculating an equal-weighted excess return. The 
monthly returns are regressed on the three Fama and French factors as detailed in Fama 
and French (1993). These portfolios are described in Kothari and Warner (2006) and 
utilized in Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000a). For each calendar month of 
the sample period, we construct a portfolio containing all firms making a repurchase 
within the prior three, six, 12, 24, or 36 months. To do this, we add firms to the portfo-
lio in the month that they repurchase stock, and the stock is retained in the portfolio for 
three, six, 12, 24, or 36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month and an equal-
weighted portfolio excess return is calculated. The resulting time series of monthly excess 
returns is regressed on the three Fama and French (1993) factors: RMRF, SMB, and 
HML. The estimated intercept from the regression of portfolio returns is used as a mea-
sure of abnormal performance.
Conclusion
Using a new dataset of the average monthly price paid and 
shares repurchased for a complete sample of U.S. companies 
that bought back their stock on the open market between 
2004 and 2011, our recent study examined the ability of 
companies to identify and profit from buying back under-
valued stock. We compared the actual price paid in the 
repurchase with the average market price of the stock over 
several windows. We showed that many companies, and in 
particular those that buy back infrequently, have been able 
to time the market with repurchases. 
To determine if the mispricing is evident at the announce-
ment or revealed through information in the market prior to 
the repurchase, our study examined how the price paid in 
the repurchase relates to announcement returns, the stated 
motivation for the repurchase, and prior stock returns. 
Although we found little or no significant relation between 
the announcement return or stated motivation and the 
Relative Repurchase Price, we did find that companies paid 
a lower price after general market declines. This evidence 
is consistent with corporate managers responding to the 
market’s overreaction to negative information about the firm 
through repurchases. We also find that companies pay a lower 
price after an aggregate market downturn, suggesting that 
managers time the aggregate market as well as the market 
for their own stock.
Did these lower prices paid in a repurchase result 
in long-run abnormal performance? Controlling for the 
Fama and French factors, our study found that infrequent 
repurchasers earn a significantly greater return than frequent 
repurchasers, with an alpha on the difference between the 
groups of 0.6% per month over three months and 0.3% per 
month over 36 months. 
Amy Dittmar is Vice Provost for Academic and Budgetary Affairs 
and Professor of Finance at the University of Michigan’s Ross School of 
Business.
Laura Casares Field is the Donald J. Puglisi Professor of Finance 
at the University of Delaware’s Alfred Lerner College of Business & 
Economics.
Long-Run Risk-Adjusted Returns
Thus far, we have demonstrated that some companies have 
been able to use their repurchases to buy back underval-
ued stock by measuring relative prices over periods up to 
six months after the repurchase. In the final part of our 
study, we examined the post-repurchase returns of repur-
chasing companies over longer windows using risk-adjusted 
returns.8 Specifically, we examined calendar-time portfolios 
over several time periods: three, six, 12, 24, and 36 months 
following the repurchase.9 To the extent that corporate 
managers have better information about the prospects for 
their own company (for which there is persuasive evidence) 
or for the market in general (for which there is almost no 
evidence), we would expect positive long-run returns follow-
ing repurchases.
For our full sample of 2,237 companies, we found 
that, on average, repurchasing companies had a positive 
and significant alpha of 0.3% per month over various 
windows from the repurchase month ranging from three 
to 36 months after the repurchase.
To examine the market-adjusted returns by repurchase 
frequency, we formed a portfolio of infrequent repurchas-
ers (those that repurchase one to four times per year) and a 
portfolio for frequent repurchasers (those that repurchase at 
least nine times a year). As reported in Table 4, both portfo-
lios exhibited significantly positive alphas over all horizons 
(from three months to three years). At the same time, the 
portfolio of infrequent repurchasers significantly outper-
formed that of frequent repurchasers over all horizons, with 
differences in “alpha” that ranged from a low of 0.3% to as 
much as 0.6% per month. These results are consistent with 
our earlier reported finding that companies that repurchase 
infrequently significantly outperform frequent repurchasers. 
Overall, this long-run return evidence demonstrates 
that, on average, companies have been able to recognize 
when their stock is undervalued, and that companies’ ability 
to time the market in this way has depended significantly 
on the frequency of the repurchasing. These results suggest 
that some managers do time the market with repurchases 
and that the long-run performance can persist for three 
years or longer. 
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Appendix  Variable Definitions 
   The table reports regressions of the relative repurchase price on firm and repurchasing characteristics. Relative 
repurchase price is measured as the percentage difference between the average repurchase price paid by the firm 
during a repurchase month (as reported in the 10 K) and the average closing stock prices as reported on CRSP, during 
various windows: repurchase month plus one, three, and six months. Accounting variables are summarized at the 
firm-year, measured at the fiscal year-end before the repurchase month. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
The regressions include year- and firm-fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the firm level. P-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
A.1. Data from 10-Ks on EDGAR
Frequent repurchaser — Indicator equal to one if the firm repurchases nine or more months in a given year. 
Infrequent repurchaser — Indicator equal to one if the firm repurchases four or fewer months in a given year. 
Annual repurch/MV — Sum annually of the monthly amounts spent on repurchases divided by the prior period’s market value of equity.  
Repurch size/MV — Average price paid for the shares repurchased times the number of shares repurchased (as given the 10-K) divided by the market value of 
equity from the previous quarter (from Compustat). 
A.2. Data from Compustat, measured at fiscal year-end prior to repurchase
Total assets — Given in millions, adjusted for inflation, in 2011 dollars.
Market-to-book — Market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity plus the long term debt and the current portion of long-term debt divided by total 
assets.  
Return on assets — Measured as income before extraordinary items for the four quarters prior to the repurchase divided by total assets. 
Leverage — Long-term debt and the current portion of long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Cash-to-assets — Measured as cash and equivalents divided by total assets.  
Dividend payout — Measured as cash dividends divided by total assets.  
A.3. Data from CRSP
Announcement return — Three-day abnormal return, measured net of the value-weighted CRSP market, surrounding the announcement of the stock repur-
chase program. 
Prior six-month market return — The CRSP value-weighted index return for the six-month period prior to the actual repurchase.
Prior six-month firm abnormal return — Compounded daily excess returns for the repurchasing firm (over the CRSP value-weighted index), measured over the 
six-month period prior to repurchase month.
Stock return volatility — Stock return volatility measured over prior six months.
Bid-ask spread — Average bid-ask spread measured over prior six months.
A.4. Data from IBES
Number of analysts — Natural log of the number of analysts following the stock from I/B/E/S prior to the repurchasing month.
Percent of analyst downgrades — Number of analyst downgrades divided by total number of analyst recommendations for repurchasing firm. Includes all 
analyst recommendation events covered by I/B/E/S in the six months prior to the repurchase month.
Change in six-month average EPS forecast — Change in average EPS forecasts of all analysts for the repurchasing firm, measured from six months prior to the 
repurchase through the repurchase month.
EPS forecast dispersion — Standard deviation of EPS forecasts divided by the average forecast using the forecast closest but prior to the repurchase month.
A.5. Data from the Insider Filing Data Feed, from Thomson Reuters
Net insider buying — Net insider purchases minus insider sales in the month of the repurchase, divided by the shares outstanding in the quarter prior to the 
repurchase.
A.6. Data from Factiva
Stated motivation of mispricing — Indicator equal to one if repurchase program announcement includes mention of “undervaluation” or “best use of money,” 
as in Peyer and Vermaelen (2009). 
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